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Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
Paul Du¨tting∗ Robert Kleinberg†
Abstract
Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent, non-negative
numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the prophet sees the entire sequence
at once. The goal of both is to decide on fractions of each number they want to keep so as to
maximize the weighted fractional sum of the numbers chosen.
The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1977-78) asserts that if both the gambler and
the prophet can pick one number, then the gambler can do at least half as well as the prophet.
Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) have generalized this result to settings where the
numbers that can be chosen are subject to a matroid constraint.
In this note we go one step further and show that the bound carries over to settings where
the fractions that can be chosen are subject to a polymatroid constraint. This bound is tight
as it is already tight for the simple setting where the gambler and the prophet can pick only
one number. An interesting application of our result is in mechanism design, where it leads to
improved results for various problems.
1 Introduction
Prophet inequalities compare the performance of an online algorithm to the optimum offline algo-
rithm in settings that involve making selections from a sequence of random elements. The online
algorithm knows the distribution from which the elements will be sampled, while the optimum
offline algorithm knows the sequence of sampled elements. Prophet inequalities thus bound the
relative power of online and offline algorithms in Bayesian settings. Not surprisingly, they play
an important role in the analysis of online and offline algorithms in these settings. A slightly less
obvious application is in algorithmic mechanism design, where they are used to design simple yet
approximately optimal mechanisms.
A classic result of Krengel and Sucheston [17, 18] shows that when both the online algorithm
and the offline algorithm get to pick exactly one number, then the online algorithm can do at least
half as well as the offline algorithm. More formally, if w1, . . . , wn is a sequence of independent,
non-negative, real-valued random variables satisfying E[maxi wi] <∞, then there exists a stopping
rule τ such that
E[wτ ] ≥ 1
2
· E[max
i
wi].
This bound is, for example, achieved by an elegant algorithm of Samuel-Cahn [22]. This algorithm
chooses a threshold T such that Pr(maxiwi > T ) =
1
2 , and selects the first element whose weight
exceeds this threshold. Alternatively, as described by Kleinberg and Weinberg [16], this bound can
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be obtained by choosing threshold T = E[maxiXi]/2 and picking the first element whose weight
exceeds the threshold.
Kleinberg and Weinberg [16] recently extended this result to matroid settings. In a matroid
setting we are given a ground set U and a non-empty downward-closed family of independent sets
I ⊆ 2|U| satisfying the exchange axiom: for all pairs of sets I, J ∈ I and |I| < |J | there exists an
element j ∈ J such that I ∪ {x} ∈ I. For these settings they prove that if both the online and
the offline algorithm have to pick an independent set of numbers, then the online algorithm again
can do at least half as well as the offline algorithm. More formally, if w1, . . . , wn is a sequence of
independent, non-negative, real-valued random variables satisfying E[maxiwi] < ∞, then there is
a way to pick A ∈ I in an online fashion such that
E
[∑
i∈A
wi
]
≥ 1
2
· E
[
max
B∈I
∑
i∈B
wi
]
.
An important application of the original result of Krengel and Sucheston [17, 18] and its gener-
alization by Kleinberg and Weinberg [16] is in algorithmic mechanism design, where — as was first
observed by Chawla et al. [7] — prophet inequalities can be used to prove performance guarantees
for simple, truthful mechanisms based on sequential posted pricing.
Our Contribution We extend the previous results to polymatroid settings. In a polymatroid
setting we are given a ground set U and a submodular1 set function f : 2U → R. A vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) is feasible if x ∈ Pf = {x |
∑
i∈S xi ≤ f(S) for all S ⊆ U}. We will restrict ourselves
to integer-valued set functions for ease of exposition; our results trivially extend to rational-valued
functions by scaling. For this setting we prove that if the goal of both the online and the offline
algorithm is to maximize w ·x over feasible x and w = (w1, . . . , wn) are the elements of the random
sequence, then the online algorithm can again do at least half as well as the offline algorithm. More
formally, if w1, . . . , wn is a sequence of independent, non-negative, real-valued random variables
satisfying E[maxiwi] <∞, then there exists a way to choose a feasible x in an online fashion (i.e.,
choosing xi when w1, . . . , wi have been revealed but wi+1, . . . , wn have not yet been revealed) such
that
E [w · x] ≥ 1
2
· E
[
max
y∈Pf
w · y
]
.
We prove this result by reducing the polymatroid setting with independent weights to a matroid
setting with limited correlation between weights. Specifically, we transform an input sequence to
the polymatroid problem into an input sequence to the matroid problem by repeating the (ele-
ment, weight) pairs in the input sequence to the polymatroid problem. We show that this leads
to a matroid consisting of several blocks, each corresponding to an element of the ground set of
the polymatroid. The resulting distributions of weights have the property that each element of a
block is associated with a weight that is independent from the weights of elements of other blocks,
but that is the same for all elements of a block. We call the resulting matroid a block-structured
matroid, and the resulting distributions block-structured distributions. Our main technical contri-
bution apart from the reduction itself is to prove that the Kleinberg-Weinberg algorithm, although
originally developed for the independent weights case, also applies to block-structured matroids
and block-structured distributions. This result is not only the main building block of our result
for polymatroids, but it is also interesting in its own right as it constitutes a prophet inequality
for a setting in which the weights can be correlated. Such inequalities are rare in the literature,
1A set function f is submodular if for all X ⊂ Y ⊆ U , f(X ∪ Y ) + f(X ∩ Y ) ≤ f(X) + f(Y ).
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and those that have appeared in the past required either negative dependence [5, 21], martingale
moment sequences [8], or additive rather than multiplicative bounds on the difference between the
online and offline algorithm’s expected payoffs [15]. Our prophet inequality allows for a different
— though, unfortunately, still very stringent — restriction on the type of correlation allowed.
An important implication of our result are novel approximation results for mechanism design
problems with polymatroid structure. This class of problems comprises, amongst others, position
auctions [11] and spatial markets [3].
Related Work We have already described the result by Krengel and Sucheston [17, 18] for the
case in which both the online algorithm and the offline algorithm are allowed to pick one number,
showing that the online algorithm can do at least half as well as the offline algorithm. This bound
is tight. This result has been extended to the case where both the online algorithm and the offline
can pick k numbers by Alaei [1], showing that the online-to-offline ratio is at most 1− 1/(√k + 3).
This matches the aforementioned tight bound when k = 1, and it remains nearly tight for k > 1, in
the sense that a ratio of 1− o(1/√k) is known to be unattainable. Finally, as already mentioned,
Kleinberg and Weinberg [16] have extended the bound of 2 to settings where the elements picked
must form a matroid. This bound is tight in the sense that it comprises the case where both the
online and offline algorithm have to pick one number as a special case, for which this bound is
known to be tight.
Hajiaghayi et al. [14] observed the following relationship between prophet inequalities and al-
gorithmic mechanism design: algorithms used to prove prophet inequalities can be interpreted as
truthful online auction mechanisms, and the prophet inequality in turn can be interpreted as the
mechanism’s approximation guarantee. Chawla et al. [7] observed an even subtler relationship be-
tween the two topics: questions about the approximability of offline Bayesian optimal mechanisms
by sequential posted-price mechanisms could be translated into questions about prophet inequali-
ties, via the use of virtual valuation functions. Alaei [1] and Kleinberg and Weinberg [16], armed
with stronger prophet inequalities, deepen this relationship even further.
Another related line of literature is work on secretary problems, which also concerns relations
between optimal offline stopping rules and suboptimal online stopping rules, but under the assump-
tion of a randomly ordered input rather than independent random numbers in a fixed order. While
the polymatroid prophet inequality that we solve here contains the matroid prophet inequality
problem as a special case, the matroid secretary problem introduced by Babaioff et al. [2] remains
largely unsolved despite recent progress.
A final related direction is work on exponential-sized Markov decision processes (MDP’s)
[9, 12, 13]. The connection here is that algorithms for prophet inequalities can be formulated
as exponential-sized MDP’s, whose state reflects the entire set of decisions made prior to a speci-
fied point during the algorithm’s execution. Most of the algorithms with provable approximation
guarantees for exponential-sized MDP’s are LP-based, while our algorithm is combinatorial.
2 Preliminaries
Bayesian Online Selection Problems In a Bayesian online selection problem we are given a
ground set U and for each x ∈ U a probability distribution Fx with support R+. This induces a
probability distribution over functions w : U → R+ in which the random variables {w(x) : x ∈ U}
are independent and w(x) has distribution Fx. We refer to w(x) as the weight of x. The goal is
to choose a vector z ∈ R|U| that maximizes w · z = ∑x∈U w(x) · z(x). For a given assignment of
weights we use OPT(w), or simply OPT, to denote the optimal value. The vector z will typically be
3
restricted to come from a space of feasible vectors F ⊆ R|U|. One common restriction is F ⊆ {0, 1}|U|
in which case zi ∈ {0, 1} can be thought of as encoding membership to a subset A ⊆ U . Two further
restrictions, matroids and polymatroids, are discussed below.
An input sequence is a sequence σ of ordered pairs (xi, wi)i=1,..|U| such that (xi, wi) ∈ U×R+ and
every element of U occurs exactly once in the sequence. A deterministic online selection algorithm
is a function z mapping every input sequence σ to a vector z(σ) ∈ F such that for any pair of input
sequences σ, σ′ that match on the first i pairs (x1, w1), . . . , (xi, wi) we have zj(σ) = zj(σ
′) for all
1 ≤ j ≤ i. An online-weight adaptive adversary that has chosen x1 . . . , xi and has learned about
w(x1), . . . , w(xi−1) chooses xi without knowing w(xi).
Matroids A matroid M is a pair (U ,I), where U is a set (called the ground set) and I ⊆ 2U is
a non-empty, downward-closed family of subsets of U (called the independent sets) satisfying the
matroid exchange axiom: for all pairs of sets I, J ∈ I such that |I| < |J | there exists an element
x ∈ J such that I ∪ {x} ∈ I. A maximal independent set I ∈ I is called a basis.
Polymatroids A polymatroid Pf on ground set U is given by Pf = {z ∈ R|U| : z(T ) ≤
f(T ) for all T ⊆ U}, where z(T ) = ∑i∈T zi and f : 2U → R is a submodular set function. A
set function f is submodular if for every two sets X ⊂ Y ⊆ U ,
f(X ∩ Y ) + f(X ∪ Y ) ≤ f(X) + f(Y ).
A submodular function is integer-valued if for every subset X ⊆ U , f(X) ∈ N.
Notation For a real number z, we use z+ to denote max{z, 0}. For a vector w with entries
indexed by a set U , and for any set S ⊆ U , we use w(S) to denote ∑i∈S wi.
3 Algorithm for Polymatroids
Our algorithm for the polymatroid prophet inequality is based on the algorithm of Kleinberg and
Weinberg [16] for the matroid prophet inequality. We begin by defining block-structured matroids,
block-restricted weight distributions, and block-restricted adversaries. The crux of our analysis is
a theorem (whose proof is deferred to Section 3.4 below) asserting that the Kleinberg-Weinberg
algorithm, applied to block-structured matroids with a block-restricted adversary, recovers at least
half of the optimal reward. Armed with this theorem, we design our algorithm for polymatroids by
reducing to the block-structured matroid case; we have tailored the definition of block-restricted
weight distribution and block-structured adversary so that they capture the type of input sequences
generated by our reduction.
3.1 Block-Structured Matroids
We begin by defining block-structured matroids and showing that to every polymatroid defined by
an integer-valued submodular function there is an associated block-structured matroid. Afterwards,
we define block-restricted weight distribution and block-restricted adversary.
Definition 1. A block-structured matroid is one whose ground set is partitioned into blocks
B1, ..., Bn such that the independence relation is preserved under permutations of the ground set
that preserve the pieces of the partition.
For a set S ⊆ B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn we define its cardinality vector q(S) = (q1(S), q2(S), . . . , qn(S)) by
setting qi(S) = |S ∩Bi| for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Lemma 1. Suppose f is a submodular function on ground set U = {u1, . . . , un}, taking values
in {0, 1, . . . ,M}. There is a block-structured matroid Mf on ground set U × [M ] with blocks
Bi = {ui} × [M ] (i = 1, . . . , n), whose independent sets are those S satisfying q(S) ∈ Pf .
Proof. The bulk of the proof is devoted to proving that the independent sets constitute a matroid.
The criterion for a set to be independent depends only on the cardinality of its intersection with
each block Bi, hence is clearly preserved under permutations that preserve the blocks. Thus, the
fact that the matroid is block-structured will follow trivially once we have established that it is
indeed a matroid.
Clearly the empty set is independent and a subset of an independent set is independent. To
verify the matroid exchange axiom suppose that we have two sets S, T ∈ I such that |S| < |T |.
Define additive set functions x, y on subsets of U by
x(A) =
∑
i∈A
qi(S), y(A) =
∑
i∈A
qi(T ).
By our assumption that S, T ∈ I we have x(A) ≤ f(A) and y(A) ≤ f(A) for all A. Define a set A
to be x-tight if x(A) = f(A). For any two sets A,B we have x(A) + x(B) = x(A ∩B) + x(A ∪B),
and from this it is easy to deduce that the union and intersection of x-tight sets is x-tight. In
particular, the set of all elements that belong to x-tight sets, is itself an x-tight set. Denote that
set by R. We have y(R) ≤ f(R) = x(R). On the other hand, for the ground set U we have
y(U) = |T | > |S| = x(U). Hence, there must be some element i 6∈ R such that y({i}) > x({i}). Let
z be any element of T ∩Bi that does not belong to S ∩Bi. The set S ∪ {z} is an independent set
in the matroid, because i does not belong to any x-tight set and hence the vector x remains in the
polymatroid after incrementing its ith coordinate. This verifies the matroid exchange axiom.
Definition 2. A block-restricted weight distribution on a block-structured matroid is a joint distri-
bution of weights for its elements, such that the elements of a block receive identical weights, and
the weight assignments to different blocks are mutually independent.
Definition 3. A block-restricted adversary is one who is restricted to choose an ordering of the
input sequence in which the elements of each block appear consecutively, and after any proper
subset of the blocks have been presented, the choice of which block is presented next may only
depend on the weights of elements that have already been presented.
Note that when all blocks have size 1, a block-structured matroid is simply a matroid, and a
block-restricted distribution is simply an independent distribution. Furthermore, a block-restricted
adversary is exactly the same as the notion of online weight-adaptive adversary defined in [16].
Thus, the special case in which all blocks have size 1 is precisely the setting of the matroid prophet
inequality of [16].
3.2 Prophet Inequality for Block-Restricted Distributions and Adversaries
Consider a block-restricted matroid (U ,I). Let w,w′ : U → R+ denote two assignments of weights
to the elements of U sampled independently from a block-restricted weight distribution. For a
given input sequence σ = (x1, w(x1)), . . . , (xn, w(xn)) we compare the set A = A(σ) selected by the
algorithm to the basis B that maximizes w′(B).
The matroid exchange axiom guarantees the existence of a partition of B into disjoint subsets
C,R such that A ∪ R is also a basis of M. Among all such partitions, let C(A), R(A) denote the
one that maximizes w′(R). Let g(A) = w′(R(A)).
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The selection algorithm is as follows: In step i, having already selected the (possibly empty)
set Ai−1, we set threshold Ti =∞ if Ai−1 ∪ {xi} 6∈ I, and otherwise
Ti =
1
2
· E[g(Ai−1)− g(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})]
=
1
2
· E[w′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))]. (1)
=
1
2
· E[w′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))− w′(C(Ai−1))]. (2)
We select element xi if and only if wi ≥ Ti.
Theorem 1. For every block-restricted matroid (U ,I) with block-restricted weight distribution there
is a deterministic online selection algorithm that achieves the following performance guarantee
against block-restricted adversaries:
E[w(A)] ≥ 1
2
·OPT.
Before providing a proof of this theorem in Section 3.4, we show how it can be used to derive
a prophet inequality for polymatroids.
3.3 A Prophet Inequality for Polymatroids
The algorithm that achieves the prophet inequality in the polymatroid setting (with rational-valued
submodular function f) does so by reducing the problem to the block-structured matroid setting
with the matroid Mf defined in Lemma 1.
If in the polymatroid setting the elements are presented in order u1, . . . , un, then the reduc-
tion constructs an input sequence in the matroid setting by presenting the elements in order
(u1, 1), (u1, 2), . . . , (u2, 1), (u2, 2), . . . (lexicographic order, U coordinate first). If in the polyma-
troid setting the weight of element ui is wi then element (ui, j) is presented in the matroid setting
with weight wi. If the matroid algorithm, while processing elements (ui, 1), (ui, 2), . . . , (ui,M),
selects a subset {ui} × Si, then the polymatroid algorithm when processing ui sets zi = |Si|.
Theorem 2. For every polymatroid Pf defined by a rational-valued submodular function f there
exists a deterministic online selection algorithm that satisfies the following performance guarantee
against online weight-adaptive adversaries:
E
[∑
i
wi · zi
]
≥ 1
2
·OPT.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that f is integer-valued; the extension to rational-valued functions follows
by a trivial scaling argument. The matroidMf is block-structured, and the weights of the elements
(ui, j) generated by the reduction are sampled from a block-restricted distribution since the weights
w1, . . . , wn are mutually independent random variables, and the weights in block Bi are all equal
to wi. Furthermore, the method for constructing the input sequence satisfies the definition of a
block-restricted adversary, since the elements of each block appear consecutively.
For any cardinality vector q, the total weight of any set S ⊆ U × [M ] such that q(S) = q is
equal to w · q. In particular, this implies:
1. The value of the vector z selected by our polymatroid algorithm is equal to the sum of weights
of elements selected in its internal simulation of the matroid algorithm.
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2. The value of OPT in the matroid setting is equal to max{∑ni=1 wi · qi | q ∈ Pf}, which
coincides with OPT in the polymatroid setting.
Combining these two facts with Theorem 1, we obtain the performance guarantee in the theorem
statement.
3.4 Proof of the Block-Restricted Matroid Prophet Inequality
We start with a proposition that generalizes the corresponding result of Kleinberg and Weinberg
[16] from independent weight distributions to block-restricted weight distributions. The proof is
straightforward and given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. For every input sequence σ, if A = A(σ), then
∑
xi∈A
Ti =
1
2
· E[w′(C(A))].
x
w
i0 i1 − 1i
ti
Ti
Figure 1: Visualization of the thresholds set by the algorithm
Next we prove that the thresholds within a given block have a specific form (see Figure 1 for
an illustration). Specifically, consider any block consisting of elements ui0 , ui0+1, . . . , ui1−1. For all
i0 ≤ i ≤ i1 define Ai = Ai0−1 ∪ {xi0 , . . . , xi}, and
ti =
1
2
· Ew′
[
g(Ai−1)− g(Ai)] , (3)
where for convenience we also set Ai0−1 = Ai0−1. We will show that the sequence of numbers
defined by (3) forms a non-decreasing sequence depending only on the weights associated with
previous elements w1, w2, . . . , wi0−1, and that for i0 ≤ i ≤ i1 − 1 the algorithm sets threshold
Ti = ti if ti ≤ w and Ti > w otherwise.
Lemma 2. Consider a block-structured matroid (U ,I) with blocks B1, . . . , Bn. For any input
sequence σ generated by a block-restricted adversary, and any block Bj , let i0, i0 + 1, . . . , i1 denote
the times when the elements of Bj are presented in σ. The sequence of numbers ti0 , . . . , ti1 defined
by (3) satisfies ti0 ≤ ti0+1 ≤ · · · ≤ ti1 and depends only on the subsequence of σ preceding time i0.
Moreover, the algorithm sets Ti = ti for all i0 ≤ i ≤ i1 such that ti ≤ wi, and Ti > wi otherwise.
Proof. By definition ti depends only on Ai0−1 and i, thus, only on the subsequence of σ preceding
time i0.
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To prove that ti ≤ ti+1 for i0 ≤ i < i1 we will show that the inequality
g(Ai−1)− g(Ai) ≥ g(Ai)− g(Ai+1) (4)
holds pointwise (i.e., for every choice of w′) and not just in expectation. Recall that g(S) = w′(R(S))
and note that Ai−1 ⊂ Ai ⊂ Ai+1, with each set in the chain containing one more element of Bj
than the preceding one.
Now consider that for any independent set S, the set R(S) is formed by going through the
elements ofM in decreasing order of w′, selecting every element that is not spanned2 by the union
of S with the earlier elements in the list. Consequently, for any S ∈ I and x 6∈ S, we have
R(S∪{x}) ⊂ R(S) and the unique element of R(S)\R(S ∪{x}) is the first element that is spanned
by earlier elements combined with S ∪{x} but not S; let us call this the critical element for (S, x).
Let S = Ai−1, S ∪ {x} = Ai, S ∪ {x, y} = Ai+1. We find that the first time an element is spanned
by earlier elements combined with S ∪ {x} it is also spanned by earlier elements combined with
S ∪{x, y}, and consequently the critical element for (S ∪{x}, y) occurs in the same place or earlier
than the critical element for (S, x). Consequently, the critical element for (S ∪{x}, y) has the same
or greater weight than the critical element for (S, x), i.e.,
g(Ai)− g(Ai+1) ≥ g(Ai−1)− g(Ai)
as desired.
Having proven that ti is monotonically non-decreasing in i, we shall now prove that for all
i0 ≤ i ≤ i1 such that ti ≤ wi, the algorithm sets Ti = ti and selects i. The proof is by induction on
i. From the definition of Ti and ti, it is clear that Ti = ti provided that the algorithm has selected
i0, . . . , i − 1. Thus Ti0 = ti0 (the base case) and for i0 < i ≤ i1 such that ti ≤ wi the induction
hypothesis implies that the algorithm has already selected i0, . . . , i − 1 thus establishing Ti = ti.
Now by the algorithm’s selection criterion, the relation Ti = ti ≤ wi implies then i is selected,
which concludes the proof of the base case and induction step.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, we consider the case of i such that ti > wi. Let i2 denote
the least such i. We will prove, again by induction on i, that Ti = Ti2 = ti2 > wi2 = wi for all such i.
Since the algorithm has selected elements i0, . . . , i2−1, we have Ti2 = ti2 which establishes the base
case. For the induction step, note that the induction hypothesis implies that the algorithm does not
select any elements in the range i2, . . . , i− 1. Consequently Ti = 12 · E[g(Ai2−1)− g(Ai2−1 ∪ {xi})].
The relation Ai2−1∪{xi} = Ai2−1∪{xi2} implies that g(Ai2−1∪{xi}) = g(Ai2−1∪{xi2}) and hence
Ti = Ti2 which completes the induction step.
An important corollary of the preceding structural result regarding the thresholds is the follow-
ing assertion for two weight assignments w,w′ drawn independently from a block-restricted weight
distribution.
Corollary 1. Let w,w′ be two weight assignments drawn independently from a block-restricted
weight distribution. For any input sequence σ generated by a block-restricted adversary, and any
block Bj, let i0, i0 + 1, . . . , i1 denote the times when the elements of Bj are presented in σ. Then,
for all i0 ≤ i < i1, (wi − Ti)+ = (wi − ti)+, and wi, ti, w′(xi) are mutually independent, so
E[(wi − Ti)+] = E[(wi − ti)+] = E[(w′(xi)− ti)+].
Finally, before proving Theorem 1 we need to prove an inequality analogous to Proposition 2
of [16], but using the surrogate thresholds ti in place of the algorithm’s actual thresholds Ti.
2In a matroid, we say that x is spanned by T if T ∪ {x} has a maximal independent set that is disjoint from {x}.
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Proposition 2. For every input sequence σ generated by a block-restricted adversary, let A = A(σ),
and let R′(A) be a set such that q(R′(A)) = q(R(A)) and R′(A) contains the earliest |R(A) ∩ Bj |
elements of each block Bj (1 ≤ j ≤ n). Then
∑
xi∈R′(A)
ti ≤ 1
2
E[w′(R′(A))] =
1
2
E[w′(R(A))].
Proof. Recalling the definition of ti in (3), we see that it suffices to prove that the following holds
pointwise (i.e., for every choice of w′).∑
xi∈R′(A)
g(Ai−1)− g(Ai) ≤ w′(R′(A)) = w′(R(A)). (5)
The equation w′(R′(A)) = w′(R(A)) is an immediate consequence of the fact that q(R′(A)) =
q(R(A)) and w′(S) = w′ · q(S) for any set S.
Let τ be a permutation of M that preserves each block and maps R(A) to R′(A). Note that
A ∪ R(A) ∈ I so τ(A) ∪ R′(A) ∈ I as well, since M is block-structured. To bound the left side
of (5), we break up the sum into separate sums, one for each block ofM. For j = 1, . . . , n let i0(j)
denote the initial index of block Bj, and let Rj = R(A) ∩Bj, R′j = R′(A) ∩Bj. We have
n∑
j=1
∑
xi∈R′j
g(Ai−1)− g(Ai) =
n∑
j=1
g(Ai0(j))− g(Ai0(j) ∪R′j)
≤
n∑
j=1
g(τ(A)) − g(τ(A) ∪R′j)
=
n∑
j=1
w′(R(τ(A))) − w′(R(τ(A) ∪R′j))
=
n∑
j=1
w′(R(A)) − w′(R(A ∪Rj)). (6)
The second line follows from the fact that the restriction of g to the independent set τ(A) ∪R′(A)
is submodular (Lemma 3 of [16]) and τ(A) is disjoint from R′(A). The last line follows from the
preceding one by applying the weight-preserving matroid automorphism τ−1 to all the sets involved.
Observe that R(A∪Rj) = R(A)\Rj . This is because R(A∪Rj) is the maximum-weight subset
R ⊆ B such that A ∪ Rj ∪ R is a basis of M, and R(A) \ Rj is one such subset. Furthermore, if
there were any other set R such that A ∪Rj ∪R were a matroid basis and w′(R) > w′(R(A) \Rj)
then Rj ∪R would have greater weight than R(A), contradicting the definition of R(A). Plugging
the relation R(A ∪Rj) = R(A) \Rj into the right side of (6), we find that
n∑
j=1
w′(R(A))− w′(R(A ∪Rj)) =
n∑
j=1
w′(Rj) = w
′

 n⋃
j=1
Rj

 = w′(R(A)),
which completes the proof of (5) and hence of the entire proposition.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Since C(A)∪R(A) is a maximum-weight basis with respect to w′, and w′ and
w are identically distributed we have
OPT = E[w′(C(A)) + w′(R(A))].
Recalling the set R′(A) from Proposition 2, we will derive the following inequalities:
E

∑
xi∈A
Ti

 ≥ 1
2
· E[w′(C(A))], and (7)
E

∑
xi∈A
(w(xi)− Ti)+

 ≥ E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
(w′(xi)− ti)+

 , and (8)
E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
(w′(xi)− ti)+

 ≥ 1
2
· E [w′(R(A))] . (9)
By adding inequalities (8) and (9) to inequality (7) and using the fact that Ti+(w(xi)−Ti)+ = w(xi)
for all xi ∈ A, we obtain
E[w(A)] ≥ 1
2
· E[w′(C(A))] + 1
2
· E[w′(R(A))].
Inequality (7) follows from Proposition 1. For inequality (8) we use Corollary 1 and that the
algorithm picks every i such that w(xi) > Ti to obtain
E
[∑
i∈A
(w(xi)− Ti)+
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(w(xi)− Ti)+
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(w′(xi)− ti)+
]
≥ E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
(w′(xi)− ti)+

 .
For inequality (9) we apply Proposition 2 to obtain
E

 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)

 = E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
w′(xi)


≤ E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
ti

+ E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
(w′(xi)− ti)+


≤ 1
2
· E

 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)

+ E

 ∑
xi∈R′(A)
(w′(xi)− ti)+

 .
Adding −12 · E[
∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)] on both sides finishes the proof.
4 Applications in Mechanism Design
Prophet inequalities are an important tool for the design of simple yet approximately optimal
mechanisms [7]. Previously known prophet inequalities could not be applied to settings in which
the set of feasible solutions forms a polymatroid. Our prophet inequality thus leads to improved
results for these settings.
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In a polymatroid single-parameter Bayesian mechanism design problem we are given a set U of
n agents that strive to be serviced. Each agent i has a private value vi ∈ R+ for being serviced.
The value vi of agent i is drawn from the cumulative distribution function Fi. A mechanism (x, p)
consists of an outcome rule x : Rn+ → Rn+, where xi specifies how much service agent i gets, and
a payment rule p : Rn+ → Rn+, where pi specifies the payment of agent i. An outcome is feasible if∑
i∈S xi ≤ f(S) for all S ⊆ U , where f is a submodular function. If f is rational valued we say
that the problem has rational constraints. An agent’s utility is linear in the quantity of service it
receives and its payment. That is, agent i’s utility is ui(b, vi) = vi · xi(b) − pi(b), where b denotes
the bids of the agents. The social welfare is
∑
i∈U vi · xi(b) and the revenue is
∑
i∈U pi(b). A
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if for every agent i, value vi, bid bi and bids
b−i, ui((vi, b−i), vi) ≥ ui((bi, b−i), vi).
A number of polymatroid single-parameter Bayesian mechanism design problems are given in
Bikhchandani et al. [4]. The following two are from Goel et al. [11] and Babaioff et al. [3] and can
be used to model sponsored search and video on demand.
• Position Auctions: There are n agents and m instances. Each advertiser i is interested
in a subset of instances Γ(i) ⊆ [m]. For each instance k let Γ(k) denote the agents that are
interested in it. Each instance is associated with |Γ(k)| positions. Position j for instance
k has quality αkj such that α
k
1 ≥ αk2 ≥ · · · ≥ αk|Γ(k)|. Let Ak = {pik : Γ(k) → [|Γ(k)|]}
denote the set of allocations (one to one maps) of agents to instances. Let ∆(Ak) denote
the distributions over such allocations. Allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is feasible if there is a
distribution over allocations of agents to positions for each instance such that agent i gets xi
clicks in expectation. This is a polymatroid [20].
• Spatial Markets: There are n agents and one seller. There is a capacitated network in
which each edge has a capacity. The agents correspond to disjoint sets of demand nodes. The
seller corresponds to a source node. The agents are interested in the sum of flows xi into
their nodes i. A solution x is feasible if and only if
∑
e∈S xe ≤ f(S) for all S, where f(S) is
the value of a minimum s-S-cut. This is a polymatroid [10].
These problems have rational constraints if the qualities and capacities are rational-valued,
which is a reasonable assumption in the sponsored search and video on demand application. In the
former the qualities correspond to clicks in the latter the capacities correspond to the number of
videos that can be simultaneously streamed.
By applying the sequential posted pricing technique of Chawla et al. [7], and using our prophet
inequality for polymatroids we obtain simple dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanisms
that are guaranteed to achieve at least half of the optimal revenue. For the position auctions
problem this is better than the best known bound for another simple mechanism, Generalized
Second Price (GSP) with reserve prices [19, 6]. For the spatial markets problem we are not aware
of any approximation results.
Theorem 3. For polymatroid single-parameter Bayesian mechanism design problems with rational
constraints the revenue obtained by sequential posted pricing is within a factor of two of the optimal
revenue.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We use linearity of expectation and a telescoping sum to obtain,
∑
xi∈A
Ti =
1
2
·
∑
xi∈A
E[w′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))− w′(C(Ai−1))]
=
1
2
·
∑
xi∈A
E[w′(C(Ai))− w′(C(Ai−1))]
=
1
2
· E[w′(c(An))− w′(c(A0))]
=
1
2
· E[w′(C(A))].
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